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Are any of our moral duties absolute? Is, for example, our duty to speak the truth (as we know it) unconditional and/or exceptionless? Whoever feels compelled to answer this in the affirmative, should pause to reflect on the following example: Would it really be a crime to tell a falsehood to a murderer who asked us whether our friend, of whom he was in pursuit, had not taken refuge in our house? Benjamin Constant who introduced this story as a counter-example to any moral theory which treats moral duties as unconditional and admitting of no exception, had no doubts about it – telling the truth is a duty, but only towards those who have a right to the truth. A right that the Inquiring murderer (IM), he thought, has clearly forfeited. To which Kant has famously replied:

“Truth in utterances that cannot be avoided is the formal duty of a man to everyone, however great the disadvantage that may arise from it to him or any other; and although by making a false statement I do no wrong to him who unjustly compels me to speak, yet I do wrong to men in general in the most essential point of duty, so that it may be called a lie (though not in the jurist’s sense), that is, so far as in me lies I cause that declarations in general find no credit, and hence that all rights founded on contract should lose their force; and this is a wrong which is done to mankind. …To be truthful (honest) in all declarations is therefore a sacred unconditional command of reason, and not to be limited by any expediency.”

Not even the ‘expediency’ of saving an innocent human life or preventing a hideous crime? Not even that, was Kant uncompromising. The small vignette on the impermissibility of a benevolent lie has acquired an almost legendary status by now. With its frank, almost oblivious acknowledgment of Constant’s reductio, and the brief, rather enigmatic discussion that followed it, it has provided a battlefield for generations of moral philosophers. While Kantians are struggling to explain away the unease felt by most impartial and philosophically uneducated observers over what looks not just as an needlessly rigorous and heartless, but also clearly counter-intuitive conclusion, his (mostly, but not exclusively consequentialist) critics see in his pronouncements either a straightforward reductio of his moral theory or at least something very close to it. 

In the present paper I will not, however, seek to settle the longstanding dispute between Kantians and their consequentialist opponents. My ambitions lay elsewhere. I propose to focus on a single controversial idea, admittedly just one of many,​[1]​ about when it is legitimate to hold agent responsible or liable for harmful consequences of his or her actions. Kant seems to suggest that as long as one fulfills his or her moral duty, he or she cannot be blamed for any potential harm that his or her duty-fulfilling action may bring about, no matter how foreseeable these may (have) be(en).​[2]​ Call this the Duty-Absolves-Thesis or DA for short.





(DA): One can be held morally and legally responsible for the bad (harmful) consequences of his/her actions, only if these are wrong in the first place, that is if their commission or omission constitutes a violation of one of agent’s moral or legal duties. No one, though, can be held responsible for the bad consequences of his or her obligatory/dutiful acts.

Strictly speaking, DA is a conjunction of two logically independent theses: (a) that you are not responsible for any bad consequences of your duty-fulfilling conduct whatsoever (Duty Absolves or DA proper), and (b) that you are responsible for all the bad consequences of your duty-violating conduct (‘wrongness implicates’). I will treat DA in a package, as a single thesis, so some of the arguments I will advance will challenge DA proper (i.e. try to show that even though the agent did his moral duty, he may still be responsible for the harm he thereby caused), while others will be meant to disproof the ‘wrongness implicates’ part of it (i.e. draw attention to cases where it would be unfair or inappropriate to hold me responsible for some harm, even though this harm clearly resulted from my wrongdoing). I am quite aware that the two don’t stand and fall together. But since they are both motivated by the same or similar deontological considerations, undermining just one of them will unavoidably have implications for the other as well.





Let me start with a concession to Kant. DA presupposes a strict separation between the right and the good. The morally obligatory course of action in S need not be the one which brings about most good (i.e. is best, or most beneficial, from some impartial point of view) in S. In fact, it doesn’t need to bring about any good whatsoever, or prevent any evil. On this picture, morality can occasionally, albeit rarely, demand that we take the most rather than the least harmful course of action open to us.

I will not dwell on this, however. Let’s simply assume, for the sake of the argument, that often the only way to accomplish some great benefits, or prevent some great harms, is by violating one or many of our moral obligations or constraints. This still doesn’t completely remove the initial oddity of DA: Why believe that a good, virtuous will gets you off the responsibility hook? Or, to put the puzzle in the words of Christopher Kutz: “A virtuous will seems to insulate from responsibility, while only the vicious will implicates. What Primo Levi called ‘the grey zone’ of collaboration with evil is artificially transformed into the sharp light of duty and the darkness of its violation.” (Kutz 2000; 3)

Secondly, I will, as far as I can, try to keep two things apart: my assessment of Kant's judgment in the particular case under consideration (namely the Inquiring Murderer case) on the one hand and my verdict on his general account of moral responsibility for resultant harm (the truth of the DA) on the other. It is one thing to ask whether I could be, as Kant contends, justly accused as the cause of my friend’s death if I lied, but not also if I told the truth to the Inquiring Murderer, and quite another to try to answer a more general, principled question about whether fulfillment of duty really absolves one from all responsibility for the harm that the dutiful action might have caused to an innocent victim.

It is easy to see that a negative answer to the first question will not necessarily settle the second. For I might come to the (correct) conclusion that I should be held responsible for my friend’s death in the IM case because by bluntly telling the harmful truth to the IM I will have failed to discharge another equally pressing moral duty, the duty to assist people in dire need.​[3]​ Once we assume that one and the same action-token, my truthful reply to the IM’s inquiry, can at the same time instantiate two moral properties, ‘violation of (one) duty’ and ‘fulfillment of (another) duty’, the comparative moral advantage of truth-telling over lying disappears and the liar and the honest guy are set morally on a par with respect to their responsibility for the tragic outcome. So a friend of Kant’s can avoid his counterintuitive conclusion in the IM case without also giving up his further idea that we can be held responsible, morally and legally, for the harmful consequences of our actions and omissions only insofar as these constitute violations of some of our pre-existent moral duties. All she needs to do is acknowledge that the conflict between the duties which the agent faces in the IM case cannot be resolved without sacrificing one of the conflicting duties, either the duty of veracity or the duty of assistance. And that for this reason the agent will be morally responsible (in some yet to be defined sense) for her friend’s death no matter what she does – for she will have violated some duty or another in any case, no matter which course of action she happens to choose. In the light of this, I will do my best to advance arguments questioning the truth of the DA directly, rather than undermining Kant’s particular judgment in the IM case. But some of the arguments presented will support a different conclusion, namely that the truth-teller cannot escape responsibility for her friend’s death by simply doing her duty. Since their force will not depend on a further premise that by fulfilling my duty of veracity I necessarily violate another duty of mine, that of assistance, these arguments will, however, effectively establish the same general conclusion – that since duty does not always absolve of responsibility (it certainly doesn’t in the IM case), the DA-thesis (at least in its present, non-qualified form) must be rejected.

2.2.	A prima facie case against the DA

According to Kant, then, at least legally, but for all we can say, morally as well, we are not equally responsible for all the (unintended) consequences of our actions; in the case of actions, harmful to others, we bear no responsibility whatsoever for any harm that may result from them, including the most predictable one, as long as our action (or omission) counts as a fulfillment of some (legal or moral) duty of ours (coincidence is to be blamed for harm, not us); whereas in the case of violations of duty the agent takes the blame for all, even the most unpredictable, indirect and distant consequences of his or her actions and omissions.

Kant’s replacement of certain widely, both intuitively and theoretically, accepted distinctions (such as whether harm was intended or not, directly caused or merely not prevented, actively pursued or merely allowed, and so on) with a new criterion (whether harm is a result of a fulfillment or a violation of our moral and/or legal duties) is somewhat surprising. The revision he proposes is, if nothing else, hard to reconcile with two firm and relatively common intuitions: that responsibility should (a) track control and (b) reflect causal contribution. The first idea is common enough – the more control (or causal influence) we have over something the more responsible we are for it; the more we lack control – as is certainly the case with distant and unforeseen (unpredictable) consequences of our actions –, the less responsibility we (can be held to) bear for it. Similarly, we are used to treat agent’s responsibility for certain harm as a function of her causal contribution to that harm​[4]​ – the more intervening events there are in a causal chain leading from my decision or action to the occurrence of harm, and the higher the proportion of other people’s voluntary acts that mediate between them, the less accountable I am for the harm. The sole focus on the moral status of action that Kant proposes, in contrast, discounts both types of concerns as morally irrelevant.

Besides, AD looks theoretically unmotivated and insofar arbitrary. Admittedly, Kant does explicitly allow for the possibility that the action with the most harmful consequences, the most dreadful outcome, is the only right and hence obligatory one in the given situation, while the action with the most generally beneficial effects is the wrong one to do. Still, the idea of absolving the agent of all the responsibility for the bad consequences of her right actions and withholding her any credit for the good consequences of her wrong actions will strike many as tendentious, if not outright ridiculous. For Kant could have insisted that among the three basic options, namely doing right, preventing evil and doing good, doing the right thing enjoys some sort of lexical priority over the other two, but nevertheless allow that on those (rare?) occasions when doing right not only interferes with doing good, but is actively opposed to it (i.e. when my performing the morally prescribed or commanded action is not only not to anyone’s benefit but is actually harmful to some), I may well owe an apology or some sort of compensation to at least those ‘victims’ of my choice to do the right thing who have done nothing to deserve the harm. 

Suppose, then, that being moral, doing what morality demands, or doing the right thing, as the Inquiring Murderer case painfully reminds us, sometimes carries not just high personal, but also moral cost.​[5]​ That occasionally, we are going to either directly harm some innocent people, or at least fail to prevent them from being seriously harmed if we decide to meet our moral obligations no matter the consequences. Suppose, in other words, that there is such a thing as ‘moral collateral damage’. If so, then one of the questions we need to answer is this: Are innocent victims of ‘collateral moral damage’ owed an apology or compensation in case they are directly or indirectly harmed because someone was determined to do the right thing, no matter the consequences in human pain and suffering? And if so, who is supposed to provide such compensation? 

Proponents of DA are going to be forced to deny the victims of collateral moral damage any valid ground for complaint, or at least any valid moral claim against the moral agent himself. The proper addressee for their claim, they will have to insist, is the evil-doer (i.e. the murderer), not the good, law-abiding guy (i.e. the truth-teller). Yet there is something morally unsettling about this kind of hand-waving and hand-washing. The conscientious agent was, after all, complicit in a criminal act, or at least what he did freely and in full awareness of likely consequences, was not just instrumental, but crucial to the latter’s success, so how can he simply walk away morally pure and clean, not a single stain on his moral robe?​[6]​ 

3.	Ways of getting Kant off the hook

Pointing to the initial oddity or awkwardness of DA is not the same as providing a conclusive proof of its falsity, of course. Perhaps DA can be supported by not plainly evident, but nevertheless powerful considerations. The following list contains those among them that I find most promising.

(i) DA is just plain false – fortunately, it is not the view Kant himself actually held or was committed to; 
(ii) the charge of DA’s oddity is misdirected – DA contradicts neither certain well-established moral principles nor our firm moral intuitions;
(iii) DA offers an account of legal (either criminal or tort) liability, not of moral responsibility; with its scope properly constrained, it becomes much more plausible;
(iv) DA should be understood as a thesis about the conditions under which it is legitimate to impose remedial responsibility on the agent, or expect her to fulfill the demands of compensatory or corrective justice;
(v) DA is very restrictive indeed, but for a good theoretical reason – it is meant to rule out the damaging effects of luck on our moral assessment of agents and/or their actions.

Kant himself suggested three other possible defense strategies which I will take up in the Appendix. That

(vi) what accounts for the difference, in moral responsibility for the outcomes of our actions, between cases of dutiful and wrongful actions is the fact that only the latter are genuinely free – and since responsibility entails freedom of choice, we cannot be responsible either (directly) for our dutiful actions or (indirectly) for their contingent harmful effects;
(vii) I am not responsible for my friend’s predicament for the simple fact that he was harmed by accident and not by me;
(viii) even though I clearly harm my friend if I tell to the murderer the truth about his whereabouts, I don’t thereby wrong him, nor do I do him any injustice – for there is no such thing as a (claim-)right of people that others lie for their benefit.

Let’s discuss these suggestions one by one. 

3.1.	Evidently false, but not truly Kant’s

The first defense strategy is to deny that Kant ever subscribed to such a view. The problem with this strategy is that it is not difficult to find other passages in Kant’s works which express pretty much the same idea as DA. 

Kant, first of all, implicitly endorses DA, or something very close to it, in the following paragraph in the essay on the right to a benevolent lie:

“This benevolent lie however, may by accident (casus) become punishable even by civil laws; and that which escapes liability to punishment only by accident may be condemned as a wrong even by external laws. For instance, if you by a lie have hindered a man who is even now planning a murder, you are legally responsible for all the consequences. But if you have strictly adhered to the truth, public justice can find no fault with you, be the unforeseen consequence what it may. It is possible that whilst you have honestly answered Yes to the murderer’s question, whether his intended victim is in the house, the latter may have gone out unobserved, and so not have come in the way of the murderer, and the deed therefore have not been done; whereas, if you lied and said he was not in the house, and he had really gone out (though unknown to you) so that the murderer met him as he went, and executed his purpose on him, then you might with justice be accused as the cause of his death. For, if you had spoken the truth as well as you knew it, perhaps the murderer while seeking for his enemy in the house might have been caught by neighbors coming up and the deed been prevented. Whoever then tells a lie, however good his intentions may be, must answer for the consequences of it, even before the civil tribunal, and must pay the penalty for them, however unforeseen they may have been; because truthfulness is a duty that must be regarded as the basis of all duties founded on contract, the laws of which would be rendered uncertain and useless if even the least exception to them were admitted. To be truthful (honest) in all deliberations, therefore, is a sacred and absolutely commanding decree of reason, limited by no expediency.“ (Kant 1797) 

Is this an unfortunate, one-time slip of tongue? For skeptics, here is another telling quotation, this time from his Lectures on Ethics:

“If we do either more or less than is required of us we can be held accountable for the consequences, but not otherwise – not if we do only what is required, neither more nor less. If all the good that we do is just what is required and no more, the consequences of our actions cannot be adjudged to our credit. …At the same time, if we do just what we ought and no less, any untoward consequences are in no way our fault and cannot be debited to us; we cannot be held responsible for them.”​[7]​
 
Kant is admirably clear here, I think (which is not always the case). He leaves no doubt – as long as we do exactly what is required (i.e. our duty), we cannot be held responsible for the consequences of our actions. Outcome responsibility only comes with doing either less (i.e. violating one’s duties) or more (i.e. going beyond the call of duty) than one is required to do. The “he didn’t mean it” strategy is therefore hopeless and we better look around for a more promising one.

3.2.	Only apparently unorthodox and counter-intuitive

We can divide this strategy into two separate, independent lines of defense: to take the first is to show that by endorsing the DA we are not forced to give up any well-supported moral principles or doctrines; the second is to accommodate the DA to fit our core intuitive judgments.

3.2.1.	doesn't contradict any well-established moral theory or principle

The most prominent moral principle which the DA seems to fly in the face of, is the principle, or doctrine of double effect (DDE). DDE is a theory about when we may do something that has both good (beneficial) and bad (harmful) consequences. It prohibits causing harm intentionally (as a means to an end or as an end in itself), but as long as we either cause harm as a side-effect of our pursuit of some other, morally permissible goal(s), or merely allow it to occur, the DDE gives us green light to proceed. At first sight, then, DDE and DA single out different sets of morally relevant properties which renders them theoretical rivals, not companions. And insofar as DDE is a well-entrenched doctrine, incompatibility with it is certainly a bad news.

A closer look, however, reveals a fatal flaw in the above reasoning. DDE is an account of what determines the moral status of a specific subset of right and wrong actions, namely those with a double effect. As such, it is silent on a related, but separate issue of moral responsibility for the bad consequences of our actions, be they intended or not. It doesn’t even pretend to answer the question of when, and to what extent, the agent is morally responsible for the harm resulting from her action. DA, on the other hand, is not a thesis about the features in virtue of which right actions are right and wrong actions wrong. As an account of the conditions under which the agent is morally responsible for resulting harm, it doesn’t even seem to have any direct implications for the moral status of actions. So given that DA is about something else, namely moral responsibility for harmful consequences, and not their impact on the moral status of the action, which is DDE’s main concern, the two cannot really contradict each other. 

3.2.2.	DA intuitively vindicated after all?

Perhaps DA is not so much at odds with the mainstream moral theory as it is counter-intuitive. Hauser and his colleagues (Hauser et al 2007) have collected a mountain of empirical evidence indicating that people tend to judge the variants of Trolley cases in accordance with the Doctrine of Double Effect (even though most of them are incapable of formulating it). Even assuming that there is, for reasons stated above, no direct clash between the well-documented Trolley case intuitions and the implications of the DA, the latter still seems to largely depart from our common-sense, pre-theoretical view on moral responsibility. For most people apparently believe that we are morally responsible for all and only intended and easily foreseeable consequences of their voluntary actions (and omissions?) and nothing else. (Kekes 2002)

There is nothing arbitrary about this principle. A rationale for it is deceivingly simple. If I decide to do or omit something when nothing forces or prevents me, if I understand both the decision and the surrounding circumstances, and if a normally intelligent person could be expected to see that the action/omission is likely to bring about certain specific results, then (and only then) it is justified to praise or blame, reward or punish, approve or condemn me for my action and its consequences. DA, in contrast, absolves the agent of all the responsibility for the consequences of his right actions and holds him accountable for all the consequences of his wrong actions. One of them, common sense or DA, must give way.

Is DA then counter-intuitive after all? Such a verdict would be premature. A proponent of DA can still hope to find intuitive support for it in a different body of empirical research. Fortunately, some empirical findings (Nelkin (2007)) do seem to detect the kind of bias (or asymmetry) in people’s attributions of responsibility which promises to at least explain, if not justify, the moral distinctions Kant makes.

I have in mind two such phenomena. The first is the so-called Intention and Action Asymmetry (IAA) and the second the so-called Side-Effect Asymmetry (SEA). IAA refers to our negative bias towards bad or evil intention.​[8]​ SEA, in contrast, is a label for our negative bias towards bad foreseen side-effects.​[9]​ In a nutshell: as scientists have discovered, we are more likely to blame people for bad intentions than to praise them for their good intentions, and we tend to blame them more readily for bad foreseen side-effects of their actions than praise them for the good foreseen side-effects thereof. In other words, we seem to be rather ‘generous’ in assigning blame to people for their bad intentions and bad unforeseen side-effects of their actions, but quite ‘mean’ when it comes to praising them for their good intentions and good unforeseen side-effects of their actions. No wonder, then, the proponent of DA can triumphatically exclaim, that in the Inquiring Murderer case Kant found the combination of alleged bad intention (vicious will) and bad side-effects (friend’s death), exemplified in harmful lie, much worse than the combination of a good intention (virtuous will) and bad side-effects (the friend’s death), as exemplified in harmful truth-telling.​[10]​ 

Seemingly, then, we are less tolerant of bad intentions (relative to bad actions) and of bad foreseen side-effects. Ideally, our moral reaction would be proportionate to its object. But when looked at more closely, our moral judgment and the accompanying moral emotions reveal negative bias – bad intentions and bad foreseen side-effects elicit negative emotions that are much stronger than the positive emotions elicited by comparably good intentions and good foreseen side-effects. The disapproval that the observed or assumed bad intention typically invokes in us is disproportionately strong compared to the approval which accompanies the recognition of good intention. Intention and side-effects simply have a much greater impact on our moral assessments of agents and actions in cases of wrongdoing than in cases of duty-fulfillment. 

What are we to think of all this? Is it of any direct relevance to the issue under consideration and if so, what implications does it have for the truth or falsity of DA? I suggest the answer is “None”. The rebuttal can go in two directions. One is to discredit moral intuitions that people have about such hypothetical cases as messy and unreliable. Ordinary moral intuitions have been repeatedly shown vulnerable to the distorting influences of a host of psychological phenomena. One of the best documented is the so-called framing effect, the impact that the choice of words, or the way we describe hypothetical cases, even their order of presentation, have on people’s intuitive judgments. Moral intuitions are malleable and as such easily manipulated. Take the example that was presented to the subjects in one of the above experiments. We could, it seems, explain the observed difference, in people’s judgment, between the bad intention relative to bad action on the one hand and the good intention relative to good action on the other, by relative triviality of the good deed and its corresponding intention (helping a neighbor fix the roof) compared to the seriousness of the bad deed and the corresponding intention (selling cocaine to your teenage cousin). If this speculation is basically correct, we could easily bring the score for the positive action/intention pair closer to the one assigned to the negative action/intention pair by simply changing the latter to ‘jumping in the river and saving a child from drowning’.​[11]​ This is just one example of ‘the noise effect’, the difficulty of identifying, among many, that very feature (or features) of the situation which shapes, often unconsciously, people’s moral judgment. For these and other reasons, we should be careful not to take intuitions, reported or measured, at their face value and draw immediate conclusions about the validity of general moral principles (such as the DA) which they allegedly vindicate. 

The alternative approach is more conciliatory. We begin by crediting the intuitions of ordinary people with some epistemic or evidential value and then look for good pragmatic, social, educational, and similar reasons that could perhaps help explain the observed asymmetry. This approach is more promising on the conception of responsibility-attribution as a social practice, for as such it may well serve other, non-moral purposes, or pursue other, non-moral goals. Perhaps there is a rationale (although I myself fail to see it) for wanting to encourage good deeds in people more than merely good intentions, and to discourage people more effectively from forming bad intentions than from performing bad actions. From a purely theoretical point of view, the assessment of the truth of such assertions, however, such a differing attitude to good and bad intentions for, and outcomes of, our actions looks arbitrary and unjustified.

The appeal to psychological phenomena like IAA and SEA in settling normative disputes, even if legitimate, cannot be straightforward, then. My main worry with this line of defense, however, lies elsewhere. It stems from the observation that the distinctions that people rely upon in their moral judgment about Help and Harm, and about Roof and Cocaine, don’t easily translate over to the IM case. Here is why. Kant, we saw, thought that if we lie, i.e. violate our duty and our friend is killed as a result, we are to blame for his death, whereas if we tell the truth, i.e. fulfill our duty, and our friend is killed as a result of this we don’t deserve any blame for his tragic death. In the original IM case, then, the alternative courses of action differ in their respective moral status (telling the truth is right and lying is wrong), but share their side-effects – in Truth, the IM finds our friend where we said, truthfully, he would be; in Lie, the IM finds our friend where we said, untruthfully, that he went – in both cases, he is killed on the spot. In contrast, in Help and Harm, both programs are morally neutral and to that extent morally equivalent, so the entire moral difference between them, if there is any, must come from the impact, good or bad, that they have on the environment. 

So what we would need to ask, instead, is how deserving the agent is for the side-effects of his actions in the following two cases:

You tell the truth for the sake of doing your duty, no matter the consequences (which renders your friend’s fate/destiny a side-effect of your telling the truth) and in one case, (a) your friend dies, while in the other (b) your friend survives (but only thanks to a fortunate twist of events).

What Kant would have to say, I suppose, is that if you are not deserving of any blame when your friend dies, you are also not deserving of any praise when he lives. In contrast to this, the observed side-effect asymmetry implies that you deserve blame for your friend’s death (a bad side-effect), but no or very little praise for his unexpected survival (a good side-effect). Admittedly, the problem with the above example is that the unintended side-effects are not equally foreseeable in (a) and (b). Despite this, the asymmetry intuition threatens to undermine Kant’s conclusion. For whatever he may want to say about our moral desert (or lack thereof) in case where our friend magically survives, common morality should, in the line of SEA, judge us blameworthy for the loss of our friend’s life both in Truth and Lie.​[12]​
 
All this makes one wonder whether asymmetry findings are applicable to the IM case at all, either directly or indirectly. Before we can draw any conclusions about how intuitive or counter-intuitive Kant’s judgments are we first need to compare actions which differ, morally, in either agent’s intentions, or in their actions’ unintended, side-effects.

An example of the first would be the pair deadly Truth vs. deadly Lie. If ordinary people were to acquit the truth-teller, but condemn the liar in such circumstances, we should be able to track the difference in their moral judgment down to the moral difference in agents’ respective intentions – the first was acting on a good intention, the second on a bad one. There are two major problems with this suggestion, however. The first is that most people’s intuitions don’t really support Kant’s conclusion – people either find both truth-teller and liar equally guilty or, what is more common, tend to condemn the truth-teller more than the liar. The second is that very few people are willing to join Kant in judging the benevolent liar’s intention to deceive the would-be-murderer bad or wrong. Whether there is a good reason for their reluctance or not,​[13]​ it effectively renders truth-telling and lying morally indistinguishable (at least from the point of view of intention) and the findings of either IAA or SEA insofar inapplicable. 

Do comparisons of the second kind, between an action which produces a good side-effect and the one that produces a bad side-effect, lend themselves any better for the purpose of assessing DA from the point of view of IAA and SEA? The following two actions differ, morally, (among other things) in their side-effects:
I tell the truth (with the intention of fulfilling my duty) and my friend lives 
vs. 
I lie (with the intention of sending the IM on the wrong track) and my friend dies.

Here the consequences are clearly not intended in either of the two cases – in the first, my friend’s survival is a side-effect of my duty-fulfillment, while in the second, my friend’s death is not just not the intended outcome, it is the opposite of it. So if the SEA were to support not only the DA as a general principle of responsibility attribution, but also Kant’s particular judgment in the IM case, people should find the truth-teller only mildly deserving for his friend’s survival in the first case and the liar highly blameworthy for his friend’s death in the second. This prediction, however, fails to materialize when put to test, since most people​[14]​ want to exonerate the liar of any moral responsibility for his friend’s death in Deadly Lie and deny the truth-teller any desert in the surprisingly good outcome in Beneficial Truth. 

But then it is hard to see how we could make the negative bias, as disclosed in thought experiments on SEA and IAA, bear, either directly or indirectly, on our assessment of either the truth of Kant’s verdict on the IM case or, even more importantly, of the DA.
 
3.3.	Meant to account not for moral, but legal responsibility

The legal terminology that Kant employs in the text could tempt one to a somewhat different line of defense. Perhaps what Kant wanted to offer was an account of legal and not moral responsibility for harm. Is this a promising way out of the trap for Kant? Here are some reasons for thinking that switching from moral to legal responsibility won’t help save either Kant or the DA-thesis.

The first comes from the context of use. Kant is trying to substantiate his differential moral attitude towards the law-abiding truth-teller and the benevolent liar with an appeal to responsibility that we would want to see imposed on each of them in case of a potentially disastrous outcome of their actions. Would such an appeal really carry much moral weight, if what he invoked were more or less contingent provisions concerning legal responsibility, as found in the existing criminal or tort law? I doubt it.

Secondly, even if his controversial remarks were about legal and not moral responsibility, the implicit account can be naturally extended to the latter.​[15]​ Kant himself draws no sharp lines between the moral and the legal realm. According to his famous formulation an action is legal as long as it conforms with the moral law, and moral if conformity to the latter is properly secured – that is, if the action originates in, or is motivated or brought about by, the sense of duty or respect for the moral law. Admittedly, he does divide his theory of obligation into two parts, Rechtslehre and Tugendlehre, but the differences between the two don’t run very deep – legal obligations regulate conduct, thereby constraining our freedom of action, while moral obligations regulate feelings, intentions, desires, attitudes, emotions, aims,… i.e. constrain our inner freedom.

Thirdly, even if the issue under discussion is the agent’s responsibility before the law and those in charge of its implementation rather than before the court of our inner conscience, the law that Kant uses as a standard of judgment here is the morally ideal law, i.e. the law which makes use of the means of coercion to ensure external, behavioral compliance with the demands of morality, and not the more or less contingent positive, existing law. But if this is correct, then we can expect the legal debate pretty much collapse into the moral one.

Fourthly, since neither the truth-teller nor the liar can be charged as a principal with committing a complete crime, the only kind of criminal responsibility they may be assigned is that of an accomplice in crime. Yet for this suggestion to work in Kant’s and DA’s favor, the liar will have to prove more vulnerable to this charge – an implication that only few people will be willing to swallow! In fact, exactly the opposite might be true – that on any plausible account of criminal responsibility and complicity in criminal acts​[16]​ the truth-teller, given that by definition he is aware of the murderer’s intentions and can predict that the truth that he is going to tell about his friend’s whereabouts will help the murderer carry out his vile plan, will be found guilty of complicity in murder, while the liar who has done his best to spoil the murderer’s plan (and failed due to no fault of his own) will be acquitted. 

This, however, need not be so. Exactly what relationship the accomplice (both with respect to his state of mind, mens rea, and his actions, actus reus) must bear to the result prohibited by law (in our case, murder) is a complicated issue. According to a popular idea, you need to 'aid and abet' the other to be guilty as an accomplice in his crime. More precisely, “to be an accomplice, my act must have something to do with why, how, or with what ease the legally prohibited result was brought about by someone else“. (Moore 2007; 401) At first, this might look like offering a sufficient ground to implicate the truth-teller in the murder, but it doesn’t. For in order to be found guilty of complicity in crime you must be proven to have had a purpose in, not just the knowledge of, the principal’s criminal action.

So given that the truth-teller only has knowledge, but lacks purpose,​[17]​ that he is not acting on any intention that he would share with the IM, I need to qualify my conclusion accordingly. I want to say, then, that the liar and the truth-teller don't really differ, morally, from the point of view of conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufificient for complicity in crime. So while Kant might be right to insist that the truth-teller should not be treated as an accomplice in murder, he is also wrong insofar as he wants to implicate the liar in it. From the point of view of the conception of accomplice-responsibility which pervades the theory and practice of criminal law, they are legally on a par. But then it is certainly arbitrary to find one of them, the liar, criminally liable as an accomplice to murder, while letting the other one, the truth-teller, get away unscattered.

Finally and most importantly, replacing moral with criminal responsibility is not going to help either Kant or the DA, since the idea of sending people to jail for trying to save an innocent victim, who happens to be their friend, by lying, i.e. by breaching their moral duty of veracity, is equally, if not even more, abhorrent than the idea of blaming them for their death. We are forced to conclude, then, that DA hardly fares any better when re-interpreted as an account of criminal responsibility for harm.

3.4.	A plausible account of legal liability for harm?

Maybe what Kant had in mind, however, was tort liability for harm and not criminal responsibility (i.e. the notion of liability found in tort and contract law, but not necessarily in criminal law). According to this proposal, Kant's intention was to offer an account of when the law should impose on the agent at least some of the costs of amending the harm that befell someone else (at least partly) because of what the agent did (voluntarily).

Does this interpretation make DA any more plausible? Well, there is at least a prima facie case for it. As Moore (1999; 1) points out, in the Anglo-American tort and contract law, “we are each liable only for those harms we have caused by the actions that breach our legal duties.” Marina Oshana (Oshana 2007; 75) concurs: “Traditionally, when we ascribe liability for harm we assume the harm resulted from faulty behavior (active or omitted) on the actor’s part and that the actor is open to judgment and response on our part for this reason. That is, we assume what might be called contributory fault on the part of the actor.” And so does Judith Thomson (1990; 192): “Under traditional tort law, a plaintiff had to show three things in order to win his case: that he suffered a harm or loss, that an act or omission of the defendant’s caused that harm or loss, and that the defendant was at fault in so acting or refraining from acting.” (my emphases)

This, however, may be a more or less contingent feature of a prevalent ‘economic’ conception​[18]​ of liability for harm underlying the existing theory and practice of tort law. According to this conception, the main point of tort law is to achieve an efficient (rather than fair or just) allocation of resources –by giving an incentive to discover the true costs of an enterprise or activity in terms of its harmful effects on others and making sure that the agents pay them, the tort law achieves a more correct pricing of the goods and services produced by that enterprise and thereby assists the market in its basic, allocating role. 

Given a close connection between law and morality that Kant insists on, however, a rather different, justice-based (Perry 2001; 59) conception of tort law may be more appropriate. According to this account, the tort law should be designed to best accomplish the goals of (either distributive or corrective) justice. The idea behind this is simple and appealing – we all have primary moral duties not to hurt or harm others; whenever we culpably violate such primary moral duties, we impose on ourselves a secondary moral duty to correct the wrong or injustice we have done. Tort liability rules are nothing but the enforcement of such antecedently existing moral duties of corrective or compensatory justice.

The central idea of tort law, then, is that some sort of compensation (ranging from apology to financial compensation) is owed for harm suffered by another person through our own fault. So in order to show the agent in the IM case liable for the harm that her friend suffered because she supplied the IM with a crucial information about her location, we need to identify some wrong or injustice that the agent thereby committed and that calls for a remedy. If the friend was harmed through no fault of the agent, the latter can’t be found liable for harm and Kant will have won this particular stage. The crucial issue, then, is the following: Is it really true that despite telling the truth which I know will almost certainly be instrumental in helping the murderer kill an innocent person, I do no wrong or injustice to the latter which would call for a correction or a remedy? That my behavior, since dutiful, neither gives any ground for my friend’s complaint nor violates any of her moral or legal rights? “No” is a very tempting reply to this question. But the issue is only apparently simple, so I will return to it with a due attention in the Appendix.

3.5.	True perhaps of a sub-species of moral responsibility?

The notion of responsibility is notoriously ambiguous. The statement “A is morally responsible for h” may express very different propositions, or give expression to very different ideas. When we say of someone that he or she is responsible for h, we may want to say that 
(a)	he or she has played some (minor or major) causal role in the production of h (causal/authorial or A-responsibility);
(b)	that, other things being equal, the benefits and burdens resulting from her action should fall to him or her (outcome or O-responsibility);
(c)	that the agent deserves some credit or blame for his action or omission (and/or the consequences thereof) (character-reflecting or C-responsibility);
(d)	that it is the agent’s duty to put situation h which is somehow morally defective or non-ideal right again (that it is, for example, his remedial responsibility to end someone’s suffering). 

Here is another suggestion, then. Once we interpret Kant’s remarks charitably, the way we should, we will have no trouble seeing that they must be about either outcome or remedial responsibility. So when Kant contends of the truthful, dutiful agent that he cannot be held responsible for the death of his friend, what he means is that the friend’s death cannot be ascribed to him either in the sense that he deserves blame for what he did (or the tragic state of affairs he has helped to bring about), or in the sense that his action gives rise to a legal or moral demand, on the part of a sufferer or plaintiff, for compensation, apology, remorse, and so on. The fact that a given harmful action was dutiful (or, according to Hill, supererogatory), in other words, completely absolves the agent from both his outcome and remedial responsibility for the harm that he may have caused by his action.

Taking into account the vast array of distinctive uses of responsibility ascriptions, we can then try to give the DA a more precise meaning. Here is one possibility:

(DA*) wrongfulness is a necessary condition of agent’s remedial or compensatory responsibility for the potentially harmful or adverse consequences of his actions. 

In other words, of all the harmful actions, only the wrongful ones place the agent under duty to amend the harm, compensate, or apologize to, those harmed by them, and the like. When his actions are in accordance with duty, compensation, apology, remorse, and the like may still be appropriate, or called for, but then the moral force of this demand will stem from some principle other than that of corrective or compensatory justice (say, the principle of charity or benevolence).​[19]​

I am not convinced that anything of importance is gained by replacing the original DA with DA*, however. For this strategy to work, the proponent of DA* would have to deny either that the truth-teller is outcome-responsible for his friend’s death (while insisting that the liar is so responsible) or that outcome-responsibility (ever, or at least in the IM case) entails remedial-responsibility. Let’s address these two issues in a reverse order.

Notice, first, that the notions of outcome- and remedial responsibility are both normative. They are both governed by considerations of justice and express our interest in fair/just allocation of benefits and burdens resulting from people's choices and actions. The only difference is in how the respective judgment proceeds. In determining outcome responsibility, we begin with an agent whose action produces beneficial or harmful consequences and ask which of these consequences can be credited or debited to him. When we try to assign remedial responsibility, on the other hand, we begin with a state of affairs in need of remedy (in IM: ‘an innocent person was murdered’) and then ask whether there is anyone whose responsibility it is to put that state of affairs right (to amend the harm, or correct the injustice done). So even though the two concepts of responsibility are clearly distinct, they are also very much interdependent.​[20]​ 

Typically, judgments about R- (the same goes for C-) responsibility are going to be parasitical on judgments about O-responsibility. In order to decide who should sometimes (in the absence of other morally relevant features such as pressing needs or special claims) enjoy benefits or suffer harms we need to know who is responsible for creating them in the first place – who to credit or blame for it.

The most natural candidate for the person whose duty it is to amend harm is (s)he who is O-responsible for it. But does it need to be so? It doesn’t. Miller (2007) admits that by default it is the person who is O-responsible for some occurring harm who should bear R-responsibility for it. And yet, the two can occasionally come apart. We may be forced to attribute R-responsibility to someone on grounds other than his O-responsibility, if the latter is difficult to determine or when we want to encourage people to take particular care in something (strict liability traffic laws are a good example). In the IM case there is no visible difference in O-responsibility between the harmful benevolent liar and the harmful dutiful truth-teller. Yet despite this Kant would have us believe that only the liar, but not also the truth-teller is R-responsible for his friend’s death.

Is there any reason for considering the IM case an exception to the rule which makes R-responsibility a more or less direct function of O-responsibility? I can see no such reason. Miller allows for various other grounds of R-responsibility besides O-responsibility: moral (what I call character-reflecting/revealing or C-)responsibility, causal (or A-)responsibility, benefit, capacity and community. (ibid.; 100-104) One of these could, then, at least in principle, explain the difference in Kant’s treatment of harmful lies (violations of duty) and harmful truths (dutiful actions). 

The problem, however, is that none of the above looks anything like a promising candidate for this role – the benevolent liar and the principled truth-teller don’t really differ (contra Kant) in their moral character, none of them benefits (more) from the situation (than the other), their capacity to amend the harm is equal(ly small), while their membership in the community plays no role whatsoever in the given situation. But if so, then R-responsibility must (at least as the IM case goes) be determined by O-responsibility alone and the two cannot really come apart in the way Kant implies.

What about the other option? Do the prospects of absolving the truth-teller of O-responsibility for his friend’s death look any better? I am equally skeptical about that. Since determining truth-teller’s O-responsibility for his friend’s death would be difficult, if not impossible without a preceding general account of when an agent is O-responsible, which is both tricky and goes beyond the scope of this paper, I propose to ask instead, whether it is plausible to find the liar, but not also the truth-teller, O-responsible. The answer, I believe, is clearly negative. My friend’s death in both variants of the Inquiring murderer case, the truthful and the untruthful, is unintended, unforeseeable,​[21]​ and causally linked to what I did only indirectly, through someone else’s decision and action – this is what ultimately matters, morally, and what both explains and justifies, contra Kant, our natural tendency to ascribe (or deny) (R-) responsibility to both liar and truth-teller. The same conclusion can also be vindicated in a different way. Moral responsibility, whether for action or omission, is a function of three parameters: ability, opportunity and awareness. When judged by these standards, Kant’s position loses any remaining appeal. For assuming that the liar and the truth-teller are on a par with respect to the first two, the ability and the opportunity (they are both capable of doing what is needed to reverse the course of events and they both get a chance to do it), the awareness-condition is clearly only met, or met to a sufficient degree, by the truth-teller – he’s got all the reason to believe that her friend is still hiding in the attic, whereas the liar has no reason to believe that her friend has left his initial hiding-place in the meantime and is now on his way to the train station. So if the notion of O-responsibility is, as is commonly assumed, gradual, I will bear some O-responsibility for my friend’s death in case I choose to fulfill my obligation by telling the lethal truth. Whereas when I try to save him by lying and the unfortunate train of events renders my utterance true, my O-responsibility for his fate will be minimal or none.

3.6.	Theoretical necessity – protecting moral responsibility against the adverse effects of (good or bad) moral luck

Kant was very cautious to rule out, as much as he could, the impact of luck on our moral judgment. That’s why he tied the moral value of the agent’s character to her motives (rather than her conduct) and the moral value of her actions to her intentions (rather than their more or less contingent outcome). According to Julia Driver (ms), luck was of Kant’s central concern: »the Kantian system is actually constructed so as to avoid the impact of moral luck on moral worth. It is a theoretical strength of the Kantian position that it insulates moral worth from luck.”​[22]​

Here are two well-known passages, one from Groundwork, where he tries to secure the goodness of the good will against the “unfortunate fate or the niggardly provision of stepmotherly nature”, and the other from the Benevolent lie pamphlet, where he contrasts doing (in)justice ((Un)Recht), after it was made immune against the vaggaries of luck, with benefiting and harming (Schaden), which cannot be done or omitted at will, or ever brought under effective control.

“A good will is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes, nor because of its fitness to attain some proposed end; it is good only through its willing, i.e. it is good in itself. …Even if, by some especially unfortunate fate or by the niggardly provision of stepmotherly nature, this will should be wholly lacking in the power to accomplish its purpose; if with the greatest effort it should yet achieve nothing, and only the good will should remain (not, to be sure, as a mere wish but as the summoning of all the means in our power), yet would it, like a jewel, still shine by its own light as something which has its full value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitlesness can neither augment nor diminish this value.” (my emphasis)

And a bit later, building on his previous insight about the threat of luck:

“An action done from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which the action is determined. The moral worth depends, therefore, not on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition according to which the action has been done.”
 
All fine and well. We don’t want to see our own moral worth as a person, or the moral worth of our actions determined by luck, whether good or bad. We can even sympathize with Kant’s efforts to make the moral status of actions (i.e. our moral duties) as independent as possible of their good or bad effects, of whether they succeed or fail to attain the end pursued in action. But why on earth would he want to protect judgments about moral responsibility for the consequences of our actions against the effects of moral luck as well? Why try to extend protection against the damaging effects of luck from the notions of moral worth and moral duties to the notion of moral responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions?

Such an (over-)ambitious project could be motivated by something like the following reasoning. No one can be held responsible for that which is beyond his or her control (the so-called controlling condition); the consequences of our actions are beyond our control, i.e. it is ultimately not in our power alone to produce or prevent them; hence we cannot be held responsible for the consequences of our actions, whether good or bad. But then no one can ever deserve praise for what he managed, or blame for what he failed, to bring about.

But if all this is true and control over whether X obtains or not is necessary for the O-responsibility for (the obtaining of) X, then the very notion of outcome-responsibility, or responsibility for the consequences of our actions, is, Kant should have concluded, confused, if not outright inconsistent, and we would do better without it. What we can no longer do, however, is pretend, as Kant seems to, that in contrast to the bad consequences of his dutiful actions (duty-fulfillment), the agent can nevertheless be O-responsible for the bad consequences of his or her wrongful (duty-violating) actions. 

This line of argumentation is not really available to Kant, then, I’m affraid. For he denies O-responsibility for harm only in the case of dutiful actions.​[23]​ When harm ensues from a violation of duty, the agent bears full responsibility for it, regardless of how remote, indirect, mediated by others’ decisions and actions, unintended or unforeseeable it was. But surely the consequences of our wrongful actions are just as elusive and dependent on factors beyond our control as the consequences of dutiful actions? And if so, are they not entitled to the same treatment then? But the whole idea of justifying different O-responsibility ascriptions as a remedy for luck is hopeless, anyway, because the consequences of our actions are always going to be subject to the whims of luck. The advocate of luck will thus need to abolish the very notion of moral responsibility for consequences (if not as a contradiction in terms, then at least as a hopeless mess) and give up our practice of ascribing it. 

Here is another possibility. What perhaps disturbed Kant more than anything else was the possibility that whether what we do is right or wrong may ultimately depend on luck, in the sense that if we are lucky, then what we do will turn out to be right, and if we are not, it will turn out to be wrong. (Moore (1990)) This is an unfortunate implication, it seems, of those normative, most prominently consequentialist, accounts that treat rightness and wrongness of actions (or what makes actions right or wrong) as a function of the overall goodness and badness of their consequences, since whether my action will produce more good than bad or the other way around is surely not (at least not always) up to me.

So when Kant emphatically denies that whether or not it is right to lie to the Inquiring Murderer about our friend’s whereabouts ultimately depends on whether, as a result of our pronouncement our friend is going to live or die, we can, I think, agree with that, even if somewhat reluctantly. For we have accepted the widely deontological framework, within which Kant is reasoning. Whoever shares Kant’s deontological intuitions will gladly admit that if lying is wrong in the IM case, then it must be for some reason other than the fact that it will have terrible consequences for your friend. The same goes for telling the truth – whether it is the right, dutiful thing to do in given circumstances or not cannot depend on its outcome, on whether it will harm or benefit our friend, if the latter clearly escapes our control.​[24]​

But the legitimate worry about the moral status of our actions being determined by sheer luck shouldn’t be confused with a somewhat different idea that since we can only be (held) morally responsible for what is under our control and the survival or the perishing of our friend is not under our (complete) control, we cannot be morally responsible for his death. For first of all, we have some, arguably quite enough, control over what course the disturbing events are going to take (we can influence it, for it is not causally pre-determined), even if due to the fact that the final outcome will result from decisions and actions of several agents which we cannot fully foresee or calculate, we cannot guarantee it or vouch for it. We may not enjoy a complete control over the course of events (for this we would need to have restricted control over every event on which this particular chain of events is contingent, and no one has such control over anything), but who cares – a restricted control (i.e. the ability to prevent a particular occurrence of the event) will do perfectly fine. 

Secondly, we may accept the control condition on responsibility, but nevertheless insist that we can be responsible for our friend’s violent death if the piece of true/accurate information that we supplied was instrumental to it. For we can agree that whether I am a good or a bad person for having done X (telling a truth or a lie to the IM) shouldn’t depend on the outcome of X (on whether my friend will live or die as a consequence of my telling the truth or my lying), if the latter is largely or even entirely determined by luck. What we shouldn’t simply assume, however, is that if the actual causal chain of events that led to our friend’s death was to some degree subject to chance, then we cannot be blame- or praiseworthy, deserving of blame or praise for what befell him. The violent death of our friend may not have been something we intended when we spoke the truth, but it was still predictable. And why would it be unfair to blame agents for the unintended, yet clearly foreseeable consequences of their actions? We do it all the time – we blame smokers for their damaged health, car racers for endangering the life of other participants in traffic, overeaters for their high cholesterol and blood pressure, car manufacturers for their products’ lethal defects, and so on and on.

Another possibility worth considering is that Kant’s main concern was not so much with the threat that moral luck poses to the moral status of our actions, as with its threat to our (equal) moral worth (as persons). For if our moral worth depends on whether we are a good person or a bad person and this in turn depends on whether we do, or fail to do, the right thing, meet or fail to meet the requirements of morality, then our moral worth is built on a rather shaky and unstable ground. Perhaps the main reason Kant had for denying agent’s responsibility for his friend’s violent death in the IM case was that he thought accepting responsibility for harm would entail some sort of recognition of guilt and guilt would put a stain in the agent’s so-far impeccable moral record – and all this for having done his duty! If we ascribe responsibility to the truth-teller for his friend’s violent death, wouldn’t this naturally invite another negative moral evaluation, namely that he must be a morally worse person for his involvement in a violent crime? But there is surely something paradoxical about the idea that meeting your moral obligations can reflect badly on you, that you can (turn out to) be a morally worse person simply for having done your moral duty.

This sort of worry is misplaced, however. It assumes too close a connection between two kinds of agent evaluations: judgments of responsibility (“A is responsible for having done X.”) and judgments of moral worth (“A is a better/worse person for having done X.”).​[25]​ The truth, in contrast, is that the two are very much independent from each other. To see this, one only needs to remember a whole range of moral propositions that can be expressed by means of responsibility ascriptions. By saying “A is responsible for X.” we sometimes ascribe mere causal or authorial responsibility to A (“it was A who did X”). Or we may want to ascribe the so-called outcome responsibility instead – when we say of someone that he or she is responsible for something in this sense what we mean is that, other things being equal, the resulting benefits and burdens should fall to him or her.​[26]​ 'A's responsibility for X' may also refer to what we might call 'remedial responsibility' – in that case saying that A is responsible for X is equivalent to saying that it is A's job, or obligation, to put something that has gone awry right again (end someone's suffering, for example, or compensate the victim of some form of injustice). 

Kant’s worry would be legitimate if “A is responsible for X.” meant “A deserves praise or blame for having done X.” Such a ‘meritocratic’ understanding, or use, of responsibility ascriptions is surely common enough. We do often invoke the notion of responsibility to express our assessment of agent’s moral merit or desert. If “I am (at least partly) responsible for my friend’s violent death (in virtue of having told the truth about his whereabouts to the IM that was instrumental in his murder)” could only be interpreted as “I deserve blame for speaking the truth”, then this might indeed be difficult, if not impossible, to square with the idea that telling the truth was the only morally right thing to do in the situation. For how can I possibly deserve blame either for doing the right thing or for thereby accidentally causing or allowing harm? We would have to give up, or so it seems, either the idea that it was my duty to tell the truth, or the intuition that I am responsible for my friend’s violent death after all. 

The problem is that the above ‘meritocratic’ reading of this particular responsibility ascription is not the only one on offer. Alternative, equally plausible interpretations are available under which the above responsibility ascription will come out true and not false. For instance, it is beyond dispute, I think, that I bear some causal or authorial responsibility for my friend’s death if my sincere pronouncement led the murderer to his hiding place. Furthermore, on any plausible construal of outcome-responsibility I would also bear some outcome- and, consequently, remedial-responsibility for his tragic death. By this I mean that it would be fair to allocate to me some burden (most of which should be borne by the murderer himself) of remedying what I earlier called moral collateral damage, the harm that (both) my friend (and his family) suffered as a side-effect of my focusing on moral duty, success, purity and integrity. So even if I’m not blameworthy for my truthfulness, even if I deserve no blame (or punishment) whatsoever for my friend’s death, there are other interpretations under which it would still be appropriate to find me responsible for his tragic death.  

So what? If Kant was primarily interested in denying the agent’s ‘responsibility’ for her friend’s death in the IM case in its ‘meritocratic’ sense, why would it matter that the agent may nevertheless be responsible for it in some other sense, one that gives rise to a duty of apology and compensation? This objection has some force. Fortunately, Kant’s reasons for denying agent’s culpability in IM are relatively weak. Kant is probably right to insist that if we tell the truth because it is our duty to do so, and our friend is killed (partly) as a result of our moral choice, we shouldn’t be considered a morally worse person for having contributed causally to her death – though we have certainly proved to be a rather terrible friend! So we also shouldn’t think worse of ourselves as moral agents, or see our moral integrity compromised. But is it really so implausible to insist that some agent-regret, some moral residue would be in order? That we should feel bad about choosing to be truthful in the situation where truthfulness and blind adherence to our moral duty came at such a high moral price? An agent who felt no regret over such a painful, even fatal choice would strike us as morally defect, even corrupt. For however we may construct the IM case, whether as a conflict between two equally binding duties or merely as a forced choice between fulfilling a moral duty on the one hand and preventing undeserved harm on the other, the agent deserves deepest sympathies for the moral predicament in which he found himself. But if so, then there is both room and reason for regret, remorse, perhaps even feelings of guilt on her part.​[27]​

Finally, and perhaps most important, the tragic outcome in Truth doesn’t even qualify as an example of bad luck. Kant's IM examples are supposed to be instances of what Thomas Nagel (Nagel 1993) calls ‘outcome luck’. The term refers to those factors outside of agent's control which crucially determine the outcomes of his actions. The natural impression that luck might be playing a similar role in the IM case is mistaken, however.

As noticed before, Kant has built an argument against holding the truth-teller responsible for the death of his friend on the premise that the harm that befell the latter as a result of the blind adherence of the former to truth(fullness) was contingent – that truth-telling is not harmful in itself. From which Kant inferred that the harm of my friend’s premature death cannot be ascribed to us, the truth-teller. But isn’t the same true of lying? Namely that since harm is also a merely contingent feature of any particular instance of lying,​[28]​ the liar also can’t be blamed for harm that the chance or accident brings about behind his back and against his explicit will/intention? But if the effects of truth-telling are no more subject to luck than the effects of lying, then the truth-teller and the liar shouldn’t really differ much in terms of their O-responsibility, should they?

But forget this unfortunate complication for a moment. Let’s grant to Kant that whatever harm may result from our telling the truth on a particular occasion, or to a particular person, it will be a contingent feature of our action. Still, being contingent (i.e. not necessary) is far from being purely accidental or subject to pure chance. A simple test with the most plausible accounts of luck​[29]​ shows that while the bad effects of lying to the IM may qualify as bad luck, the bad effects of truth-telling which Kant was most eager to insulate from the adverse effects of luck, do not.

Intuitively, the meaning of 'luck' is determined by its proximity to the notions like chance, accident, (mis)fortune,… The most popular definition of luck is in terms of lack of control: “What(ever) is not within our control, is a matter of luck.” This, however, is both too vague and too broad. The sunrise, for example, is not within our control (we can do nothing to either bring it about or prevent it), but we wouldn't call it a matter of luck. (Pritchard 2006) 

Here, then, is a better proposal: “We call something a matter of (good or bad) luck when 1) it is of interest or importance to us, 2) it was not under our control, and 3) we had no reason to expect its occurrence. So I am lucky if I find a twenty pound note on the street, because it is of interest to me, I did not put it there or arrange its being there in some other way, and I did not expect to find it at all, because usually when I walk along the street there are no banknotes to be seen at all.” (Schinkel (2008)) This gets us a bit closer, but is still too imprecise for our purpose. After all, what it is reasonable to expect, often depends on contextual parameters that have more to do with the state of the agent’s mind (and what he knows about the world) than with the nature of the given event.​[30]​

Driver (ms) and Pritchard (2006) propose and defend an alternative, modal account of the nature of luck. According to this account, “a lucky event is an event that occurs in the actual world but does not occur in most of the nearest possible worlds to the actual world where the relevant initial conditions for that event are the same as in the actual world.”

Let’s apply this standard to the IM case, then. The decision box below presents four possible outcomes given two basic courses of action available to us, and two sets of circumstances which are going to determine the outcomes of our choices.

Assuming the IM will trust my words

              CircumstancesAction	My friend remains hidden in the attic	My friend runs to the train station
I am truthful (TRUTH)	(O1) My friend is murdered	(O2) My friend survives
I am not truthful (LIE)	(O3) My friend survives	(O4) My friend is murdered

In order to determine whether any of the four possible outcomes, O1-O4, is due to luck, good or bad, we need to look, the modal account says, to those nearest possible worlds in which the relevant initial conditions are the same. If the event under consideration only takes place in the actual world, but is suspiciously missing from all, or most, relevant nearest possible worlds, then and only then was its occurrence in the actual world a matter of luck.​[31]​ But which are the relevant initial conditions that we need to keep fixed on our journey through parallel worlds? I stipulate that it must be things such as the agent’s, the victim’s and the murderer’s characters, intentions, determinations, plans, values, and the like (some of which we will need to add to Constant’s and Kant’s rather colorless and blank original description). For example, a sudden change in my friend’s character or his relation to me – a sudden surge of deep mistrust in me, a helpless panic attack, and the like – certainly belongs to a farther possible world than his remaining confident in me. In a similar vain, a sudden change of the inquiring murderer’s character – say, an instant decision to drop the plan for trivial reasons, or an unexpected, out of blue moral transformation – would trivialize the distinction between events that are due to luck and those that are the result of someone’s agency. Finally, let’s restrict the use of ‘unlucky event’ to only those outcomes that are bad as a result of luck. 

So equipped, we can start our quest. There are just three variables that we can manipulate in order to depart from our actual world.​[32]​ The most promising candidate for a(n un)lucky event is that outcome which we find most unexpected and surprising given what we know about our main characters and given the usual expectations people have about the ways of the world. Such are undoubtedly the two outcomes in the second column, O2 and O4. If my friend trusts me (as he surely must do given that I have built my rescue plan on this assumption),​[33]​ then in most of the nearest possible worlds to the actual one in which his trust in me remains unshaken (call them ‘trusty-worlds’ or ‘t-worlds’) he will have remained hidden in the attic. Next, focus upon the subset of t-worlds, in which I have revealed his hiding-place to the IM. In most of such worlds he will be hunted down and killed (outcome O1).​[34]​ Now look at the other subset of t-worlds, those in which I have sent the IM away under the false pretence. In most, if not all, of these worlds, my friend is going to survive this particular murder attempt (outcome O3). The connection between what I do and the outcome of my action is then strongest, and so least surprising, in the first column. Accordingly, we will come across outcomes O1 and O3 in most of the nearest possible worlds in which the agents themselves have undergone little change of character (compared to particular choices they make and the external circumstances that these choices create).​[35]​ The outcomes in the second column, O2 and O4, on the other hand, will occur more frequently in more distant possible worlds, those inhabited by more dissimilar counterparts of me, my friend and the IM, but are going to be missing in the nearest possible worlds to the actual one.
 




In the paper I have critically scrutinized Kant’s implicit proposal that we should not hold agents responsible for the harm that might result, directly or indirectly, from their scrupulous performance of dutiful/obligatory actions. According to Kant, one bears moral and legal responsibility for the bad (harmful) consequences of his/her actions only if the latter were wrong in the first place, that is if their commission or omission constituted a violation of one of agent’s moral or legal duties. 

The above principle may sound plausible at first. Reflection, however, shows it to generate some highly counter-intuitive implications. Despite this, I have tried to give Kant a fair trial. I carefully assessed the (often meager) evidence that he himself presented in favor of a suggested moral asymmetry, and listened to reasons that one could advance in its support. In the end I remained unconvinced, however, and hopefully so did the jury of readers. It is hard to find compelling theoretical reasons for a moral distinction that Kant introduces into the domain of outcome moral responsibility, between the bad consequences of right and the (equally) bad consequences of wrong actions. 








“’the French philosopher’ confounds the action by which one does harm (nocet) to another by telling the truth, the admission of which he cannot avoid, with the action by which he does him wrong (lædit). It was merely an accident (casus) that the truth of the statement did harm to the inhabitant of the house; it was not a free deed (in the juridicial sense). For to admit his right to require another to tell a lie for his benefit would be to admit a claim opposed to all law. Every man has not only a right, but the strictest duty to truthfulness in statements which he cannot avoid, whether they do harm to himself or others. He himself, properly speaking, does not do harm to him who suffers thereby; but this harm is caused by accident. For the man is not free to choose, since (if he must speak at all) veracity is an unconditional duty. 

The ‘German philosopher’ will therefore not adopt as his principle the proposition (p. 124): “It is a duty to speak the truth, but only to him who has a right to the truth” first on account of the obscurity of the expression, for truth is not a possession, the right to which can be granted to one, and refused to another; and next and chiefly, because the duty of veracity (of which alone we are speaking here) makes no distinction between persons towards whom we have this duty, and towards whom we may be free from it; but is an unconditional duty which holds in all circumstances.”

The above passage suggests three other possible lines of defense for choosing Kant's preffered option, truth-telling, in the IM case:

My truth-telling was
(vi) duty-bound and hence not genuinely free
(vii) not really harmful to my friend
(viii) even if harmful, not wrongful or injust

Let's address them in turn.

5.1.	»Duty-bound, hence not trully free«

This line of defense (also found in Lectures on Ethics, p. 59-60) is a clear non-starter. Let me start with a minor objection. The argument from the lack of freedom is difficult to square with many passages in Kant’s writings on ethics, where acting out of duty is praised as a mark of free/autonomous and rational agents and contrasted with heteronomous conduct, i.e. conduct motivated by mere inclination or instinct. As a matter of fact, many commentators ascribe Kant’s erroneous treatment of the Inquiring Murderer case to his emphasis that my relation to the victim is one of friendship, hence my only, or at least predominant, motive for helping her must be a morally worthless one of affection or love for her. Given Kant's equation between moral and free action, we would expect him to deny freedom of action to the lier, who has after all acted out of affection, but not to the truth-teller, who did what he did out of respect for moral law and in opposition to his natural inclination, or urge, to privilege, and give priority to, his friend and his needs.​[37]​ 

Is the argument from the lack of freedom of choice any more plausible outside the narrow context of Kant's moral philosophy? In trying to rebut it, the opponent of DA has two options. She can deny that by being duty-bound to veracity we are not really free to choose a lie, or not free in a relevant sense. Or she can instead accept Kant’s premise that we are not free to choose whether to comply with the moral law or not and then deny, in deference to Harry Frankfurt, that ability to do otherwise were necessary for moral responsibility, i.e. reject the principle of alternate possibilities (or some similar version of it, say van Inwagen’s 'principle of possible prevention'). 

In other words, for his appeal to necessity to work, Kant needs to establish the following inferential sequence: obligatory -> unfree -> not-responsible. The opponent, however, can question both steps, that is the first (if obligatory, then not free) and the second conditional (if not free, then not-responsible). 

Let's start with the first. Why believe that moral duty eliminates freedom of choice and of action? Kant’s argument for the first inference builds upon the so-called ‘alternative possibility requirement for responsibility’. In order to be guilty, or deserving of blame for X, this principle says, it must have been possible for you not to do (i.e. to omit doing) X. But if you could not have avoided doing X, then it is unfair to blame you for having done it. The first, immediate problem with this defense of the DA is that the necessity that we face in the IM case is not a metaphysical one that typically concerns incompatibilists in the debate about whether there can be genuine freedom of choice and of action in a deterministic universe. If we face any necessity at all (which I myself doubt), it is of a very different kind, namely practical, or normative, or rational. Kant famously equates the 'dutiful' with the 'practically necessary',​[38]​ but surely practical necessity, whatever it may be, does not entail metaphysical necessity (i.e. the inability to choose and/or do otherwise) and it is only the latter that threatens to rule out moral (and legal) responsibility. But if it is metaphysically possible for us to withhold truth to the IM, albeit at the pain of being  practically irrational or immoral (judged by Kant’s standards alone), then we are, or at least in principle can be, responsible for having told the truth to him.

Let me put the same point in a different wording. The kind of freedom that the obligation deprives the agent of is not the same as freedom that an agent must lack in order to shrag moral responsibility off his shoulders. All that the dutiful agent lacks is other permissible, i.e. equally rational options, not genuine alternatives or metaphysically possible courses of action (including abstenance from the one that the duty prescribes). Just because morality presents an action as obligatory, or practically necessary, it does not thereby remove all other metaphysically viable options from the menu, leaving the agent with nothing to choose from. Yet this is the only sense of the 'lack of freedom' (namely lack of choice) that matters for the ascription or denial of responsibility. For Kant to plausibly deny the agent's responsibility for the violent death of his friend in the IM case, he would need to convince us that the agent lacks genuine freedom of choice in the situation, not just that she misses other, equally or more appealing (or simply rational), options. But since Kant himself admits that lying is a genuine possibility in those circumstances (for how else could the agent violate his absolute duty of veracity in Lie?), the agent is undoubtedly free in the relevant sense and so cannot avoid responsibility that comes with the exercise of his (capacity for) free choice.





Can the prosecution rest its case then? Before we bury Kant, two more solutions he offers in passing need to be considered and rebutted – that I did no harm and that even if what I did harmed my friend, I committed no wrong or injustice by telling the truth. 

Let's begin with the idea that I did not harm my friend. Kant seems to suggest that the ensuing harm to my friend was caused by accident and not by my truth-telling. According to this interpretation, then, we should be reluctant to ascribe, to the truth-teller, the responsibility for the harm that her friend suffered in a form of a violent death, because we cannot identify any free deed of the former such that the resulting harm could be attributed to it – but if so, harm must have occured as a matter of pure accident instead. 

Schwarz (1970) is one of the few who finds this transmission of responsibility congenial:

“A crucial distinction is introduced here by Kant, namely, between the act of making an unavoidable truthful statement from which ensues harm to another person, and the act by which someone wrongs another person (the difference between the Latin noceo and laedo). The effect of the first kind, says Kant, must be attributed to accident and cannot be attributed to a free deed of the one who is compelled to make a statement. For, ‘if it can't be helped that he must speak,’ he has no choice under the law of freedom but to be truthful. If harm ensues from his truthfulness, it is not he who causes it; any harm is here an event of chance caused by accident.

I think that this distinction is well founded. If the consequences of a truthful statement cannot be thought to be determined by it, they cannot be imputed to the agent. Kant, therefore, speaks also of the "unforeseen" consequence. This practical-formal, thus legal, argument in no way precludes our duty to take into consideration the possible consequences of our words so far as we can foresee them. But the indeterminate or "broad" ethical obligation to protect the life and to further the happiness of others to the best of our ability cannot displace the strict duty of truthfulness, and we cannot hold our- selves accountable for whatever uncertain effects may follow when we are compelled to speak and therein adhere to the truth. We may think also of cases of legitimate compulsion, for instance, of being subpoenaed to testify. One may become undeserving or meritless, without becoming guilty.“ (ibid.; 64)

Can we make sense of this kind of excuse? Would it, or should it, convince my friend? Here is how one could try to develop this idea. My friend suffered harm (after all, he lost his life), but either no harm was done to him (no one harmed him) or at least it wasn’t me who harmed him. The first suggestion, I believe, can be quickly dismissed. My friend was a victim of a murder, after all, not an earthquake or a deadly disease. So not only was he harmed, he was harmed by someone rather than something. The second interpretation hardly fares any better. It is fueled by the intuition, I suppose, that if I did the right thing by telling the truth, then all the harm that befell my friend (at least partly) as a result of me providing an accurate information must have stemmed from the murderer's evil intention and action with a major contribution of accident or bad luck. Yet, consider the causal chain again. My friend lost his life as a result of being, let's assume, shot to death (without justification), and the shooting was carried out succesfully with my assistance, because of something I did deliberately and in full awarereness of not just possible, but likely, consequences, namely reveal my friend's hiding place. Now on any plausible account of harm(ing), if something I did put another person in an objectively bad situation (by thwarting one of her core interests) or in a comparatively worse situation than the one he would have been in had I not acted the way I did, i.e. had I not told the truth, I harmed that person. So there can hardly be any doubts about whether I harmed my friend or not. The fact that I pursued no evil intention/goal in my action, that in doing what I chose to do I was ignorant or negligent of its possible detrimental effects, cannot alter this basic fact. What it might, and should, do is mitigate the degree of my moral and legal responsibility for the harm done. But it cannot absolve me of all the responsibility for his death, for I have knowingly (though unwillingly) become complicit in a criminal conspiracy to end his life.​[40]​

Kant seems to assume, mistakenly, that if harm was merely accidental to truth-telling then it cannot be imputed on the agent as its cause. Here the underlying thought seems to be that if what the agent does is not harmful in itself, intrinsically, essentially or in virtue of what it is, its very nature, then she (or her free deed) cannot be considered the cause of the harm, rather we should ascribe the harm to chance or accident instead. How plausible is this as a general principle? Even if we accept the questionable binary opposition (if harmfulness is not an essential property of X, then it must be a purely accidental one), the fact that the ensuing harm is a contingent feature of the action performed does not really prove that the action was not one of harming.​[41]​ Both ordinary language and moral and legal theory allow for the possibility that harm can be caused (or allowed) without intention and/or foresight. But if you can harm someone non-deliberately, unknowingly, even contrary to your best intentions (at least the tort law is, as we have seen, built on this premise), why deny that you harm someone by doing X if your doing X puts him in an objectively bad, or comparatively worse, position, or thwarts his interests and you can clearly foresee this consequence at the time of your choice?

A different line of rebuttal is also worth exploring, insofar as it promises to bypass objections against the charge of harming. Let’s assume, uncontroversially, that to harm is to cause harm. All it takes to show that I harmed my friend by telling the truth to the IM would then be that my telling the truth caused my friend to die. This might not look very promising at first. For surely it was the IM’s shooting that caused his death and not my words to the IM. Besides, didn’t Kant deny that the truth-teller could be considered the cause of harm on the basis that his action was only contingently harmful, i.e. not sufficient for harm? These worries should not discourage us, however. It suffices to remind oneself that an event, A, can be the cause of another event, B, without being sufficient for its occurrence, to see that Kant’s inference from ‘it is not necessary that if X, then H (harm to B)’ to ‘X was not the cause of H’ is invalid. Furthermore, as Moore rightly points out, “some accomplices are causes of the harms they aid another to cause, whereas other accomplices either make no causal contribution to a harm by their aid, or they make quite small causal contributions to that harm”. (Moore (2007); 421) So I can be guilty of complicity in crime even if the causal contribution I personally made to the harm was relatively small or none. But if so, then the question “Which of these classes do truth-telling and lying to the IM belong to when they implicate me in murder – do I aid the IM to cause my friend’s violent death by causing it myself, or is my causal contribution to the latter small or even negligible?” becomes less pressing to address. 

Luckily, then, whether I caused the harm to, or harmed, my friend by telling the truth (or by my failed attempt to lie) or not is not crucial here. It would be an important issue to settle if one believed that every instance of wrongdoing is an instance of harming (that ‘wrongdoing’ and ‘harming’ are co-extensional terms). For only then would it be necessary (even though not yet sufficient) to establish that I harmed my friend in order to prove that what I did was wrong (since on this account, there can be no wrong without harm). But this is not what Kant’s critics primarily object to here. I have, after all, granted Kant the (admittedly controversial) assumption that telling the truth to the IM was the right thing to do. So no amount of harm to my friend that I can be justifiably identified as the cause of, can establish that I acted wrongly in speaking truthfully. Rather, the crucial issue is whether, if my telling the truth was part of the causal chain that led to my friend’s violent death and if I could foresee this (or had every reason to believe, at the time of the utterance, that it would lead to it), I bear some responsibility for it or not. 

The question, then, is not whether I harmed my friend or not by doing what I did, but whether or not I am partly responsible for the harm he had suffered as a result of my action, regardless of whether the harm was directly caused or merely not averted. As long as the reader shares not just my own, but a widespread, sentiment/intuition that one can be morally responsible not just for the harm directly caused, but also for the harm that one could have prevented, but did not, my objection retains its full force. That’s why it doesn’t really matter whether we classify my truth-telling to the IM as causing (i.e. harming) or merely allowing harm to my friend. For we can insist that even though I did not directly harm my friend, I still bear some responsibility for his tragic fate, for I have willingly and knowingly omitted an alternative course of action (telling a lie) that could have (and almost certainly would have) saved him. Hence little, if anything, is gained by resisting the conclusion that by revealing my friend’s hiding-place, I have directly harmed him. For whether I did or not, it is indisputable that I at least allowed the worst possible harm to befall him. And harmful omission (of assistance) is certainly as good a ground for assigning moral responsibility (or tort liability) as any other. 

5.3.	»Harmful, but neither wrong nor injust (harm done, but not wrongly or unjustly)« 

So denying that I harmed my friend by revealing his hiding place is clearly not going to work. Fortunately, there is a way out of this for Kant. Assuming I did harm my friend by telling the truth about his whereabouts, I can still get myself off the remedial or corrective responsibility hook as long as causing him harm in these circumstances was neither wrongful nor injust. For on the plausible assumption that you can only owe apology or compensation to someone if you have wronged her or did her injustice,​[42]​ as long as we can convincingly show that the truth-teller has neither wronged her friend nor committed any injustice to her, she won't be responsible for her death, not even in a minimal, remedial sense. And since we did agree with Kant at the outset that telling the truth was morally right, and since being morally right entails not being morally wrong, the prospects start to look brighter for Kant – it trully does seem implausible to argue now that we have wronged our friend or done her injustice by doing something that was not wrong to do.

Let's reconstruct Kant's argument then:

(1) No action-token can be both morally right and morally wrong.
(2) Telling the truth to the IM is the morally right thing to do in the IM case.
Hence, from (1) and (2)
(3) Telling the truth to the IM is not morally wrong in the IM case.
(4) For an action to be morally wrong, it must be an instance of either wronging someone or commiting an injustice against someone. 
Or 
(4*) Wronging and commiting injustice are jointly necessary and separately sufficient for wrongdoing.
Hence, from (3) and (4)
(5) I have neither wronged my friend by telling the truth to the IM nor have I thereby committed any injustice to him.
But since it is also true that
(7) Without wrongdoing (wronging?) there can be no remedial responsibility, and without injustice there can be no obligations of corrective or compensatory justice.
(8) I cannot be responsible for my friend's death, not even in a minimal, remedial sense, nor can I be under any obligation to correct any injustice, or put any wrong that she has suffered right again.

Kant's critic again has two options here:​[43]​ first, she can argue that you can be responsible (in one of the many senses of this word) for harm which someone suffered through your action or omission, even though you did no wrong or injustice to him by causing or failing to prevent this harm. Or she can take the easier route and question Kant's claim that by revealing your friend's hiding-place to the IM you neither wronged him nor did him any injustice. The critic, then, can challenge the truth of either premise (7) or premise (5) of the above argument.​[44]​
 
Let's begin with the premise (7). Is it really true that I can be under no obligation to remedy the harm that I caused, or helped cause, or failed to prevent, as long as by causing or allowing harm to a particular person I neither wronged her nor did her any injustice? Our intuitions about the IM case are not so straightforward, I'm affraid. On the one hand, we are not perfectly immune to the appeal of saying that if someone was wronged, but it wasn't you who wronged him, you bear no direct responsibility to remedy the situation. Equally, if someone was a victim of injustice, but it wasn't you who committed it, you cannot be put under an obligation to either correct the injustice or compensate the victim for it. Imposing such a burden would be simply unfair. This set of intuitions is balanced by another, however, suggesting that we should at least feel bad about our role in the whole process, or have doubts about the way our commitment to moral obligations was abused and twisted to serve an evil purpose. Also, if someone was wronged and/or suffered injustice and we have done something which we knew will facilitate the action that constituted the wrong and injustice done to him, pointing to the fact that we did not personally perpetuate the wronging and the injustice, but merely assisted it or stood by, will not even provide a convincing excuse, let alone a plausible justification. Even if our (causal) contribution were merely to the harmful aspect of a wrongdoing (such as the murder of our friend), but not also to its wronging or injustice side (which I find hard, if not impossible, to keep apart), most of us still find some moral residue in the form of agent-regret, apology, even compensation appropriate, and would look at a content truth-teller with the same suspicion that Bernard Williams felt towards the truck driver who feels no remorse or regret over the death of a young girl that he blamelessly ran over. 

Another point. The question of how exactly 'harming', ‘wronging’ and ‘doing injustice’ are related to each other is notoriously difficult and far too complex to address properly in such a short space. For the purpose of this examination, I will therefore simply assume, uncontroversially, I think, that every instance of wronging is an instance of doing injustice and vice versa, that whenever I commit injustice, I wrong someone.​[45]​ In contrast, harming, even intentional, doesn't seem to be conceptually linked to wronging and doing injustice.  It is, then, at least in principle, possible to harm someone without thereby comitting any wrong or injustice to him. Punishment, for example, is defined as intentional infliction of harm on someone for the purpose of restoring the subverted moral universe, preventing future crimes or remoulding the criminal's character and personality. Yet only few of us would be willing to object to the very idea of a morally legitimate punishment.​[46]​

This, however, need not be anything other than a mere conceptual concession on the part of Kant's critic. For Kant's strategy to work, he would need to convince us that doing harm was neither wrong nor injust in the case at hand. This brings us to the second issue. I suppose everybody agrees that my friend was not just harmed but wronged as well, and a victim of injustice by being murdered. The question we need to ask then is whether he was not just harmed, or allowed harm, but wronged and done injustice by my revealing his hiding-place to the IM. What reasons does Kant give for believing that I have done no wrong or injustice to my friend even though I knowingly provided the IM with a crucial piece of information? Well, as far as I can tell, there is just one. Kant seems to presuppose that in order to commit injustice to you, I must violate some rights of yours or other. And the only right he can think of is the right that others lie for your benefit. Since there neither is nor can ever be any such right, I cannot have violated it and my friend has no ground for a complaint that I did him injustice.

Such a conclusion is clearly premature, however. Even if Kant is correct to insist that no one can legitimately demand that others sacrifice their moral duties for his or her benefit or convenience, we can think of other potential rights that I will either infringe or violate by telling the truth to the IM. How about the right to assistance in a legitimate self-defense, the right to life and bodily integrity (interpreted broadly, as a right to the provision of life-saving and integrity-preserving measures), the right to the aid, the right not to be a victim of crime, and so on?

Kant is blind to all these possibilities. The only right he can think of is the odd-sounding 'right that others violate their moral duties for our convenience', the right so construed that no one would want to grant it to any person. Kant's blindness might have been of a theoretical origin. Perhaps he believed claims about rights and privileges to be reduceable to corresponding claims about the permissibility or impermissibility of actions. According to this 'simple' view, as Thomson (1986) calls it, “You may permissibly do X” entails “No one (including me) has a claim-right against you that you not do X”. Now if permissibility of X entails absence of claim-rights with respect to non-X, then this must be even more true of an obligation to X – so that if I ought to tell the truth to the IM, then my friend cannot have any claim-rights against me that I omit telling the truth which I could violate by telling the truth. Yet this 'simple view' is, as Thomson and Feinberg show, mistaken. There is nothing obstruse about believing both that it was my overall duty to tell the truth and that I have thereby infringed upon, or violated, one or several of my friend’s right(s). It simply doesn’t follow from “I did what in the given situation was the right thing to do, all things considered (i.e. a Rossian ‘duty proper’)” that “I didn’t wrong anyone” or that “I didn’t commit any injustice” or that “I didn’t infringe or violate any(one’s) rights”. 
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^1	  Despite its brevity, the short essay abounds by controversial declarations. Here is just a selection of Kant's most counter-intuitive claims:(i) It would be impermissible/wrong to lie to the Inquiring Murderer, even if this were the only way of saving my friend’s life because (ii) telling a lie to the Inquiring Murderer constitutes a violation of our duty of veracity, which is both an absolute legal duty (to humanity) and a perfect moral duty (to ourselves).(iii) By telling the truth I may have, as it turns out, harmed my friend, but I did him no injustice.(iv) As a matter of fact, I didn't even harm him – for harm was caused by accident (casus), not by something I did. (v) Even if I have harmed him, I cannot be held responsible for the harm he suffered, namely his violent and untimely death, for my decision to tell the truth was not really free; suppose I cannot avoid answering the Inquiring Murderer's question, and suppose my choice is restricted to two options only, telling the truth or lying, then given that I am unconditionally bound by the duty of veracity, I am not really free to choose and do otherwise.(v) Harmfulness is merely an accidental feature of truth-telling; given that in the case under consideration the harmful effects of telling the truth escape our control, no one can blame/imput them on me – bad luck is responsible for them, not me.(vi) As for the so-called benevolent/charitable lie, almost anything (the slightest coincidence) can render it criminal; but if so, its legal status is a matter of pure accident; whatever only accidentally complies with the law, however, is justifiably considered unjust (from the point of view of external laws).(vii) If my lie, my violation of the universal and absolute duty of veracity, doesn’t prevent the murder, but, due to some perverse and unlikely twist of events/reversal of fortune, actually helps the Inquiring Murderer hunt down and kill my friend, then I am going to be justly accused as the cause of his death, even if I played my part in the Murderer's plan against my best intentions and knowledge. Whereas if I tell the truth and, as a foreseeable consequence of that, the Murderer locates and kills my friend, I bear neither legal nor moral responsibility for his death.(viii) Whoever lies, whether from noble/admirable motives or not, must therefore bear responsibility for the bad consequences of his actions and omissions and accept the punishment imposed by the court.
^2	  Or in the IM case: no one can blame me for the violent and untimely death of my friend, if all I did was fulfill my moral duty of veracity by telling the truth about his whereabouts to the inquiring murderer, even if it was pretty clear to me that the latter will use the information that I provided to find and kill my innocent friend, that is, even though by speaking the truth I consciously (but not willingly) made myself an accomplice in a violent crime.
^3	   An appeal to the duty of assistance is probably the most common Kantian solution to the IM case. Such a solution comes with a cost, however. For in the case of a genuine conflict between duties the only way to fulfill one binding duty is by violating another, equally binding duty. But this would imply that one and the same harmful action-token can be both dutiful and wrong, and it would seem to follow from DA that in such cases we both are and are not responsible for the harm we may cause. So the things look even grimmer for Kant. Kant himself, of course, does not allow for a genuine conflict between duties and is therefore, at least on the face of it, immune against this sort of objection. I say 'on the face of it', because his position comes at a considerable cost. As long as he denies the possibility of a genuine conflict between Rossian all-things considered, resultant duties, I have no quarrel with his position. With respect to Rossian prima facie duties, on the other hand, his options are fairly restricted; to deny the very possibility of a genuine clash between two or more prima facie duties is both implausible and unmotivated; if, on the other hand, he wants to allow for such conflicts, then he should also make room for some moral residue in the form of due compensation, apology or regret/remorse. Yet in his discussion on the Inquiring Murderer case Kant is suspiciously silent on this.
^4	  For a persuasive defence of a causality requirement for both moral responsibility and accomplice liability see Moore (1999) and Moore (2007).
^5	  It is often overlooked that consequentialism and deontologism are on a par in this respect. Just as there is collateral moral damage when we focus on maximizing the good, there is such a thing as a collateral moral damage of committing oneself hundred percent to doing the right thing. What’s different is the particular form that collateral moral damage takes in each case. If we decide to pursue the consequentialist agenda, we will be occasionally forced to commit gross injustice (think of the paradigmatic objection against consequentialism, the permissibility of sentencing an innocent person to jail or death). If, on the other hand, we are committed to doing the right thing, we will sometimes do or allow serious undeserved harm to innocent people (which might also be plausibly considered a form of injustice). Any moral theory, if it is to be complete, should therefore provide some clue about how to deal with such cases, a sort of basic account of corrective or compensatory justice. Some of the objections I will raise in the paper amount to a charge that Kant’s account of moral responsibility for harm not only doesn’t properly address this issue, but fails short of providing an even prima facie plausible starting point for an account of corrective justice for victims of collateral moral damage.
^6	  He has, after all, by telling the deadly truth, if not made himself an accomplice in crime, then at least interfered with his friend’s core protected interest in avoiding personal injury and death, and for this harm alone the tort law shall find him liable and impose a duty of compensation on him. I discuss the idea of harm that calls for compensation, or of injustice that needs to be corrected, in more detail later on.
^7	  What is left unclear is what stance Kant took on the issue of responsibility for the consequences of our supererogatory actions. Hill (2000) treats them on a par with dutiful actions, but the following passage makes one wonder: “On the other hand, if we do either more or less than we need, the consequences can be imputed to us, either as merit or demerit.” (Kant (1963); 59, my emphasis).
^8	  Malle and Bennett ran a series of experiments to test the hypothesis that there is a higher degree of blameworthiness for bad intentions relative to bad actions than praiseworthiness for good intentions relative to good actions. They invited subjects to judge how responsible (deserving or blameworthy) agents were for each of the following actions or intentions. Positive pair:[action] helped a neighbor fix a roof                                (10+)[intention] intends to help a neighbor fix a roof                  (3+)Negative pair:[action] sold cocaine to his teenage cousin                       (10-)[intention] intends to sell cocaine to his teenage cousin       (6-)It turns out that in general intentions get less praise and blame than their corresponding actions, but there is twice as much discounting of praise when it comes to intentions as discounting of blame. For example, forming the intention to help a neighbor fix his roof engenders half as much praise, relative to actually helping him, as the blame engendered by forming the intention to sell cocaine, relative to actually selling it.
^9	  The Side Effect Asymmetry was observed in judgments of responsibility for foreseen side-effects. It turns out that people judge agents as having a high degree of blameworthiness for bad unforeseen side effects, and offer hardly any praise for good unforeseen side effects. Joshua Knobe gave subjects two vignettes that confirmed this hypothesis: Harm ConditionThe vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also harm the environment.”The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about harming the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.”They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed.Help ConditionThe vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, and it will also help the environment.” The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about helping the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.”They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was helped.Most subjects said the vice-president deserved blame in the Harm Condition, while few said he deserved praise in the Help Condition. When it comes to side-effects, then, we have a new kind of asymmetry. Doing good things (as unintended side-effects) does not engender praise; in contrast, doing bad things (as unintended side-effects) does seem to call for sanctions.
^10	  And the same no doubt goes for the combination of a bad intention and good side-effects in the life-saving lie).
^11	  I owe this suggestion to my colleague Nenad Miščević.
^12	  On the assumption, of course, that if the agent deserves blame for the bad unforeseen side-effects of her action, then she must deserve at least equal, if not even more, blame for their bad foreseen side-effects.
^13	  This will depend on how plausible we find the following principle: that for every intentional action A and intention I, if action A is morally wrong, then intention I must be morally wrong as well. (That the intention of a morally wrong action is itself necessarily wrong.) I myself am rather sceptical. Whatever initial appeal this principle might have, the abundance of examples of well-motivated duty-violations will raise serious doubts about its truth. We could perhaps try to save the above principle by transforming it into something like “For every intentional action A and intention I, if A is morally wrong, then I must be morally wrong as well – provided that A is intended, as a means to an end or as an end in itself, under that very, i.e. moral, description”. That, however, would rob it of all interesting content by bringing it dangerously close to the empty (tautological?) “It is wrong to intend to do, and to intentionally do, that which you have every reason to believe is wrong”.
^14	  Admittedly, this estimation is not based on a large representative sample, only on my first- and second-year students’ reactions.
^15	  This seems to be the point of agreement between the authors so diverse as Thomas Hill jr. (Hill 2000), James Rachels (Rachels 1997; 153) and Alenka Zupančič (Zupančič 1993; 53). Herbert Paton (Paton 1986), on the other hand, simply assumes the whole dispute is about our moral, not legal, duties.
^16	  For some accounts of the former see Honore & Hart (1962), Moore (1999) and (2007) and Duff (2006), for an extensive treatment of the latter Kutz (2000).
^17	  While the liar lacks both.
^18	  I borrow this term from Perry (2001).
^19	  This reading finds additional support in Hill’s rendition of Kant’s original puzzle: “to ask of an agent whether he is responsible for the bad consequences of his deed is (for Kant) just to ask whether by his deed he has incurred an obligation to try to compensate for damages, rectify the situation, or accept other appropriate costs in response”. (Hill 2000; 160) Hill seems to agree, then, that the responsibility for harm that Kant is interested in is remedial responsibility and that the issue of who should bear it needs to be settled, ultimately, by reference to outcome responsibility.
^20	  In Klampfer (2004) I have offered the following argument for such a claim: “Ascriptions of these two types of responsibility are governed by similar considerations of justice, the only difference being in the point at which the judgment is asked – with O-responsibility we are interested in what would be a just or fair allocation of those benefits and costs that flow from agent's action before they are distributed, whereas with R-responsibility the starting point is the state of an unjust distribution of costs and benefits that urgently needs to be remedied. But since causal considerations play an essential (or even paramount) role in determining desert the pattern of which, in turn, forms the basis for redistribution of costs and benefits, it is safe to assume that the very same causal considerations will play an equally important role in the context where we try to determine the pattern of just or fair distribution for the first time. This common feature of O- and R-responsibility thus explains both their similarity and the role that causation plays in both.”
^21	  In fact, it is not equally unforeseeable. Unless one is ready to assume, along with Kant, that we can never, not even with the smallest degree of certainty, foresee even the most immediate and short-term consequences of any decision or action, it is quite clear that the tragic outcome is much more a result of bad luck, and hence much harder to predict, in Deadly Lie than in Deadly Truth. Given this, it would be much more natural to ascribe R-responsibility for my friend’s death to me, or to ascribe more of it, in Deadly Truth than in Deadly Lie.
^22	  For a more detailed discussion on this topic, one that goes beyond the scope and ambitions of the present paper, see Moore (1990). For an excellent account of many subtle distinctions that underlie moral assessment of agents, as well as various types of agent assessment, in Kant see Jokić (2002).
^23	  And perhaps supererogatory as well. But even if Hill (2000) is right about this, he will need very different, perhaps even pragmatic reasons, to substantiate such an extension of the DA.
^24	  Perhaps we have to do with two related worries here instead of one. The first arises from our commitment to something like the control condition on responsibility – if the bad effects are beyond our control, if ultimately they are a matter of chance, then they cannot be imputed on us, or taken to count against us in 'the court of morals'. The second stems from certain hidden deontological assumptions – if the outcomes of our actions are largely determined by chance, then they are more or less contingent, external features of our actions, but since the right- and the wrong-making properties must be intrinsic, the rightness or wrongness of what we do cannot depend on its actual outcome. The role of chance is thus twofold – if we stress its 'out of control' aspect, it jeopardizes our practice of praising and blaming agents for what they did or failed to do and the notion of responsibility that underlies it; if, on the other hand, we stress its 'contingency' aspect, then we have no choice but to morally discount the outcomes of our actions and treat them, contrary to our firm intuition or better judgment, as morally irrelevant or impotent. Outcome or resultant luck then seems to have two far-reaching theoretical implications – it forces us to give up the idea of outcome responsibility and to say goodbye to consequentialism. But of course we can also preserve both and reject the control condition on responsibility instead, or the idea that rightness either itself is an intrinsic property of actions, or at least supervenes on such properties. 
^25	  I borrow this distinction from Greco (2006).
^26	  This notion is normative (governed by considerations of justice) and gives expression to our interest in fair or just allocation of benefits and burdens resulting from people's choices and actions. 
^27	  This conclusion shouldn't depend on whether we find agent-regret and guilt appropriate even when the agent did nothing wrong, that is on who we choose to side with on a wider issue of moral dilemmas. For an account of moral dilemmas that is sensitive both to their complex nature and to often contradictory aspects of our moral phenomenology, see Williams (1981).
^28	  That much is at least true of the harm to our friend in the IM case, even if we accept that by lying we always and necessarily commit injustice, if to no one else than to humanity.
^29	  The most popular accounts of luck are those in terms of what (a) is beyond agent’s control, (b) is unreasonable to expect and (c) occurs in the actual world, but fails to occur in the relevant subset of nearest possible worlds.
^30	  According to Schinkel’s reasonable-expectation-account, my friend’s death in Truth cannot be ascribed to, or blamed on, bad luck, since it was reasonable to expect that my friend will be killed as a result of my true reply (I had every reason to believe that he was hiding in my attic and that if I tell the IM where he was he would look for him there); in contrast, his death in Lie, does qualify as an effect of bad luck, for given what it was reasonable for me to believe about my friend’s location (on the basis of his trust in me), it was not reasonable to expect him to be on his way to the train station (where I sent the IM, thinking that I ‘m sending him away) and so it was a matter of pure chance that the IM found him and killed him.
^31	  Kant seems to equate the class of events whose occurrence is due to pure chance or luck with the class of all non-necessary or contingent events. For him, whatever does not occur by necessity, occurs by chance. And whatever occurs by chance has the chance, or accident, as its cause, and cannot be attributed to anyone’s free agency. If my telling the truth doesn’t necessarily harm my friend (which it certainly doesn’t, since there are possible worlds in which he remains unharmed – where he runs away, or where IM changes his mind and spares his life), then harm, when(ever) it actually occurs as a result of my true utterance, must be due to chance and therefore not my own doing (i.e. something that could be attributed to me as its cause). But such use of ‘luck’ and ‘chance’ is both awkward, from the point of view of its ordinary meaning, and too crude to serve any interesting philosophical purpose. For, as Aristotle correctly observed two millennia ago, while “some things always come to pass in the same way, others do so for the most part. It is clearly of neither of these that chance is said to be the cause, nor can the 'effect of chance' be identified with any of the things that come to pass by necessity and always, or for the most part. But as there is a third class of events besides these two-events which all say are 'by chance'-it is plain that there is such a thing as chance and spontaneity; for we know that things of this kind are due to chance and that things due to chance are of this kind.” (Physics, Book 2; Chapter 5; my emphasis) So not only things that ‘always and by necessity come to pass in the same way’, but also those ‘things that come to pass in the same way for the most part’ we are reluctant, and justifiably so, to attribute to chance and luck. Since Aristotle has both common sense and ordinary language use on his side here, I will adopt his view on chance and luck and reject Kant’s unnecessarily permissive one. Accordingly, I will continue to treat events which we would expect to occur in circumstances C, because they (statistically) normally occur in C, as not being a matter of chance or luck, even if they don’t always or necessarily occur in C. I’m grateful to my colleague Nenad Miščević for drawing my attention to Aristotle and for helping me navigate through tricky modal issues in this and the following paragraphs. 
^32	  And only two ways, I should add, of manipulating them, if we are to stay in the nearest possible worlds to the actual one (or the relevant subset thereof) – we can either slightly change several variables or we can more drastically change just one of them. To keep the picture simple, I will assume that the possible worlds which differ from the actual world in less respects, but to a greater extent, are nearer to the actual world than those possible worlds that differ from it in more respects, but to a lesser extent. Nothing, however, hinges on this assumption, as far as I can tell.
^33	  Mind that my decision to speak the truth is, in virtue of its motivating source, revealing of me alone and says nothing about either the IM or my friend’s character. 
^34	  I say ‘most’ rather than ‘all’ in order to take into account the possibility that he may have left the attic for other reasons than the loss of trust in me, for example, because he has chickened out.
^35	  This disassociation of agent’s (assumed) character and the choices she makes is one of the reasons why we are reluctant to ascribe those choices and actions to her (as an agent), or why we keep searching for other causes for, and explanations of, her behaviour. Behavioural explanations in terms of (good or bad) luck or chance can then be classified as a subspecies of those alternative, non-agential explanations. See Sher (2002).
^36	  Outcomes 1 and 4 are identical and this for an obvious reason – because the information is true – but they differ morally (in 1 it is meant to be true, in 4 it is true accidentally, contrary to my intention) Outcomes 2 and 3 are identical and the reason for this is again obvious – because the information supplied is false – but they differ morally (in 3 it is meant to be false, while in 2 it is false accidentally, contrary to my best intention)
^37	  Here is another worry. It might seem as if Kant is building his defense of the harmful truth-teller on two conflicting assumptions: that speaking the truth was unavoidable or necessary, and that the harm that befell my friend as a consequence of it was accidental. Kant can give neither of these assumptions away. He needs necessity to rule out responsibility, but he also needs chance to rule out harming. This tension is not irresolvable, however, as will soon become apparent.
^38	  This is, after all, one of his reasons, or the main reason, for denying the possibility of a genuine moral dilemma or conflict of duties.
^39	  See Frankfurt (1969) for some examples of actions for which we tend to hold the agent morally responsible despite the fact that he couldn’t have done otherwise. For a nice overview of the current state of the debate on free will and determinism, see Šuster (2007). 
^40	  The charge of harm(ing) to my friend finds further support in the account of intentional harm that underlies the theory and the practice of tort law. Tort law protects people’s core interests against harm intentionally or unintentionally caused by the activities of some third party. When is harm intended and when not? “A defendant is said to intend harm if she either desires to bring harm about, or she is substantially certain that harm will ensue as a (possibly undesired) side-effect of her activity.” (Perry 2001; 58, my emphasis) So not only can I not possibly escape liability for harm that befell my friend (for I am going to be liable for it even if I can prove that I did not intend his harm), my telling the truth to the IM will constitute intentional harm, since it will be hard to deny that I was “substantially certain that harm to my friend will ensue as a side effect of my telling the truth about my friend’s whereabouts to the IM”. 
^41	  What could, I wonder, possibly motivate the view that, true, the given action was harmful to someone, yet it was not of a harming kind?
^42	  In other words, that both outcome and remedial responsibility entail wronging and that corrective justice entails doing injustice.
^43	  Actually three, for one could question premise (1) as well. Surely, one and the same action-token can be both prima facie right and all things considered wrong, or vice versa. It is perfectly plausible to say of truth-telling to the IM, for example, that it is prima facie morally wrong (because it causes undeserved harm), but all things considered morally right (because the fact that it fulfils the duty of veracity trumps any possible welfarist considerations). In fact, it is even more plausible to claim, as many of Kant’s followers did, that it is prima facie morally right, but all things considered morally wrong. I will not pursue this line of rebuttal any further, however, because it renders my initial concession to Kant insincere.  
^44	  I am simplifying a bit here. For if Parfit's analysis of actions which cause people to exist in a less than ideal conditions (Parfit 1984) is correct, then there might well be such a thing as a victimless or impersonal wrong(doing). This might look like an emergency exit for the critic of Kant, for he may now argue that even if I neither wronged nor committed any injustice to my friend by telling the truth to the IM, my conduct was nevertheless in a way morally faulty, making blame and guilt (or some sort of moral unease) quite appropriate. I don't think Kant's critics should accept this offer, however. Admittedly, Kant himself seems to embrace the idea of impersonal wrong(doing) or injustice, when he condemns lying to the IM as a wrong or injustice committed against humanity at large (but no one in particular). The suggestion that if I tell the truth to the IM, I may be guilty of an impersonal wrong or injustice, is nevertheless problematic. It fails to accommodate a firm intuition that whatever duties we may owe as a consequence of our harmful action, we will have owed at least some of them to our friend, or at least some of them will arise from what we did to him. As long as we classify the harmful truth as an impersonal wrong or injustice, this personal aspect remains a kind of an unresolved mystery.
^45	  Remember, however, that on this account neither wronging nor treating injustly need entail harming – wrongdoing and injustice can be perfectly harmless, but no less wrong for this reason. 
^46	  Boonin (2009) is a notable exception.
